“Asia” en un mundo postliberal. ¿Cómo se observa el fin del orden internacional liberal en las potencias de la región?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31391/vvn2ck54Palabras clave:
Relaciones internacionales, Orden internacional liberal, Asia, Estudios regionales, Cambio de paradigmaResumen
Este artículo analiza la fragmentación del orden internacional liberal (OIL) y cómo este fenómeno es interpretado y gestionado por las potencias clave de la región asiática. El autor sostiene que, mientras Occidente percibe esta crisis como una pérdida de valores, en Asia se analiza desde un realismo pragmático enfocado en la estabilidad y la capacidad de los sistemas internacionales para generar crecimiento. El fin del orden liberal implica un realineamiento de valores globales. Mientras que China y Bharat (India) vislumbran oportunidades para reivindicar su estatus de potencias, Japón y Corea del Sur enfrentan un futuro incierto y retador debido a su profunda dependencia económica y de seguridad con Estados Unidos.
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